Abstract
Introduction
The security of cryptographic circuits mainly depends on their resistance against all kinds of attacks. While mathematical attacks search for trapdoors in the cryptographic algorithm, implementation attacks focus on weaknesses in the implementation of the algorithm. In this contribution we give an overview of the state-of-the-art in implementation attacks and hardware countermeasures. Implementation attacks can be divided into two categories: side-channel attacks and fault attacks. Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information based on some side-channel. This is a physical quantity such as time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation or sound. A fault attack is conducted by injecting a fault in a cryptographic implementation, which causes some stored values to change. These incorrect values compromise the security of the system. Section 2 and 3 focus on side-channel and fault attacks, respectively, together with some countermeasures. Conclusions are given in Sect. 4.
Side-channel attacks
This section elaborates on the three most commonly exploited side-channel attacks, namely timing, power analysis and electromagnetic radiation attacks. For power analysis attacks, countermeasures at the circuit level are addressed. Other side-channels such as sound and infrared radiation will not be addressed in this contribution.
Timing attacks
In 1996 Kocher et al. introduced the concept of timing attacks by showing that secret information can be extracted through measurements of the execution time of cryptographic algorithms [6] . Timing attacks are applicable to all implementations that have a non-constant execution time which depends on the bits of the secret key.
Power analysis attacks
Two years later Kocher et al. performed successful attacks by measuring the power consumption while the cryptographic circuit is executing the implemented algorithm [7] .
Standard CMOS is the most commonly used circuit style to implement digital circuits. Its popularity is the result of its low power consumption and its robust behavior. Yet this is also the source of information leakage. To explain why the power consumption of a circuit can reveal information on the data that are processed inside, we look at the power consumption of a single CMOS inverter. Figure 1 shows the four possible switching events at the output of an inverter.
It is clear that an inverter consumes no power when the output value does not change (of course this is only true to the first order, because in reality there is also leakage power and short-circuit power). On the other hand, a change of value causes supply current to flow and power to be consumed. This fact does not only hold for an inverter, but also for all other logic gates and for registers. Power analysis attacks are based on this observation. More precisely, if the value of a secret key bit determines wether a transition occurs or not, measuring the power consumption reveals the value of this bit.
The most straightforward power analysis, called Simple Power Analysis (SPA), uses a single measurement to reveal the secret key by searching for patterns in the power trace. However, implementations that are resistant against SPA attacks, can still be broken by using a more advanced technique, namely Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this case many power measurements are evaluated using statistical analysis.
Countermeasures for side-channel attacks
Security is as strong as the weakest link, therefore protecting cryptographic systems should be done on all levels of abstraction, which are depicted in the security pyramid in Figure 2 . Each abstraction layer represents specific modelling, design and implementation issues that must be covered for secure system operation [12] . In this contribution we focus on the circuit level to address countermeasures for side-channel attacks as well as fault attacks.
As explained in Section 2.2, the power consumption of a circuit depends on the output transitions of the gates. If these transitions depend on secret information, the security of the implementation can be compromised. Hence, to make a circuit resistant against power analysis attacks, the power consumption should be independent of the secret information. The circuit-level approaches to achieve this can be divided into two categories: custom logic styles and standard logic styles. Custom logic styles are only applicable to custom ASIC implementations. Standard logic styles combine standard cells from existing libraries into new standard cells. Hence, they can be used for FPGA implementations as well as standard cell ASIC implementations. Tiri et al. developed SABL [5] , which is a custom logic style, and WDDL [15] , which is a logic style consisting of standard cells. In the remainder of this section both SABL and WDDL will be discussed, because they represent the stateof-the-art in logic styles.
Sense-Amplifier Based Logic (SABL)
To make the power consumption of a gate independent of the input values, SABL achieves the following goals: the output switching is independent of the input values and the total load capacitance always sums up to a constant value.
The first goal is achieved by using differential and dynamic logic. Differential logic makes sure that a 1-0 input transition causes the same output transitions as a 0-1 input transition, but it does not hide the difference between a transition (1-0 or 0-1) and no transition. This problem is solved by making the logic dynamic, i.e. precharging the output in the first half of every clock cycle and evaluating the correct output value in the second half. In this way, there is a switching event in every clock cycle.
The second goal is achieved by designing a secure cell library in which the load capacitance of a gate is equal for all input values. This library consists of an inverter, a NAND-gate, an XOR-gate and a flip-flop, which should be enough to implement all cryptographic algorithms. To guarantee that the pull-down networks are balanced and completely discharged, design rules for the pull-down network are given in [16] . 
Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL)
The main drawback of the SABL approach is that it is only suitable for custom ASIC implementations. WDDL achieves the same goals as SABL by using cells from an existing standard cell library. However, to reduce the load on the precharge control signal, WDDL uses a precharge "wave", i.e. the precharge signal ripples through the combinatorial logic. In Figure 4 a cascaded WDDL AND gate and flip-flop are shown. The WDDL gate requires the inputs to be precharged before they are sent to the complementary gates. A precharge circuit after the registers makes sure the next gates receive correct inputs. 
Electromagnetic radiation attacks
A third side-channel is the electromagnetic radiation [4, 9] . An ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA) attack can be done by using the same methods as for power attacks. Therefore, the terms Simple EMA (SEMA) and Differential EMA (DEMA) are commonly used. However, EMA attacks can extract much more information than power attacks. The reason is that the latter measure the complete power consumption, while EMA attacks can zoom in on smaller parts of the circuit.
Fault attacks
The second kind of implementation attacks are fault attacks. They are based on hardware faults, which are usually caused by some unexpected condition or defect. However, they can also be applied deliberately by the use of fault insertion techniques. The damage they can cause was first elaborated by Boneh et al. [3] . Their target application was RSA with CRT. Biham and Shamir introduced differential fault attacks (DFAs) on the DES algorithm [2] and they showed that DFAs are applicable to any secret key cryptosystem. In the research community two types of investigations are being performed. The first type is investigating the actual ways to induce faults in a cryptosystem i.e. it deals with so-called physical security and the other one is examining vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms with the assumption that some faulty computation happened. In this paper we consider only the former one.
Usual sources of faults are glitches (voltage, clock, temperature, radiations i.e. "microwave attacks") or beams (UV light, X-rays, laser, camera flash, etc.). They can be semiinvasive or invasive. For the former type of fault insertions the best results were achieved by depackaging the chip (as for invasive attacks), but the passivation layer of the chip i.e. the shield covering the chip remains intact. More precisely, unlike invasive attacks they do not require electrical contact to the metal surface. As an example of a cheap semiinvasive attack optical fault induction attacks were introduced by Skorobogatov and Anderson [14] . They showed that it is possible to change the state of any individual bit in a microcontroller by using a camera flash and a laser pointer. Their target was an SRAM cell but this type of attacks is applicable to any other kind of memory as well. Another type of semi-invasive attacks are done by electromagnetic induction i.e. eddy currents [10] . The follow-up work of Samyde et al. [11] summarizes all kinds of possibilities to read secret data from memories. They compare the effects caused by optical induction on one side and eddy currents on the other side. The conclusion was that for the latter resolution is not so precise as for optical fault attacks. Skorobogatov and Anderson suggested to use self-timed dual-rail logic as a countermeasure. The idea behind this approach is not just to have a logical 0 or 1 encoded as HL and LH (or vice versa), but also to prohibit the HH state. Namely, this combination signals an alarm, which will typically reset the processor. This property is also present in WDDL logic (Sect. 2.3.2). If the circuit is read before the output is ready, the outputs and of Figure 4, will not yet be differential. As WDDL is glitch-free, only one transition can occur during evaluation from the precharge state to a differential state (01 or 10).
Considering glitches-based attacks, the first practical result was given by Aumüller et al. in [1] . They introduced a spike, i.e. a certain deviation from a standard interval for a smart card parameter e.g. the supply voltage. They performed two attacks on a smart card with an RSA coprocessor and proved that these type of attacks are feasible even if some countermeasure [13] is deployed.
Most of the techniques for fault insertion target the secret data that are manipulated during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, but some are directed on faults on memories. An overview paper dealing with several ideas about these issues for memories and their secure use is the work of Neve et al. [8] . The authors also mention a number of countermeasures to prevent those threats, such as: dual rail precharged logic, sensors, etc. Sensors are supposed to monitor sudden changes in temperature, voltage or similar and act accordingly. By their function they can be active or passive.
All attacks mentioned above are considered to be semiinvasive. Invasive fault induction includes probing the circuit with active or energy probes [17] . Other options mentioned are electron or ion beams.
As for countermeasures, [11] mentions the importance of hardware countermeasures and lists the necessary requirements for the protection of modern smart cards. Means to achieve minimal physical security include: implementing the CPU using random place-and-route to avoid the visibility of the registers, memory encryption, use of self-timed logic with built-in alarm propagation and alarm sensors for temperature, X-rays, etc. It is up to the manufacturers to investigate the risks and decide about the best combination of countermeasures.
Conclusions
This contribution gives an overview of the state-of-the art in side-channel and fault attacks. Implementing cryptographic circuits is always a trade-off between security and performance. This work focuses on the most efficient, but also the most costly type of countermeasures, namely countermeasures at the circuit level. However, for securitycrucial applications these kind of countermeasures might be unavoidable.
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